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The aim of this paper is to analyse the indirect effects of environmental management
system implementation and certification. Specifically, the paper comprehensively
assesses the effects of International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 14001
and European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS) certification as
well as experience with implementing environmental management systems on (a)
organisational activities outside the scope of environmental management systems,
(b) pollution prevention, and (c) product stewardship. This is done by applying multi-
variate regression analysis to a large multicountry and multiperiod dataset. The anal-
ysis finds heterogeneous effects that are limited specifically as concerns pollution
prevention and product stewardship and cannot establish clear links to national busi-
ness systems. Given this and the differences between environmental management
system standards, implications for global governance in the context of new public
environmental management and the role of national governments in implementing
sustainability, even beyond environmental protection, are discussed. Ultimately, the
paper evidences on potential limitations of the major international environmental
management system standards ISO 14001 and EMAS in supporting the diffusion of
advanced practices such as pollution prevention and product stewardship that are
necessary for sustainable development. In doing so, it highlights that government‐
led public environmental management remains crucial for organising governance,
especially in the context of voluntary standards that are applied internationally.
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2 WAGNER1 | INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, new public management and the role of governance sys-
tems in guiding private firms are being analysed empirically based on
theories drawn from organisation studies and especially institutional
approaches such as the national business system concept (Whitley,
1999). This paper relates this trend to the context of voluntary gover-
nance and self‐regulation in the area of environmental sustainability
(Lenox, 2006), which commenced with a first wave of command‐
and‐control‐based public management and regulation (Ghosal, 2015)
that started in 1973 after the publication of the first report of the Club
of Rome and lasted to around 1983. This initial phase was followed by
a second wave of applying more market‐based instruments, which has
been superseded by a third wave from 1993 onwards characterised by
voluntary initiatives (Delmas & Toffel, 2004; Prakash, 2001), where
new public management and related deregulation made
standardisation based on voluntary environmental management stan-
dards pivotal (Delmas, 2002; Testa, Heras‐Saizarbitoria, Daddi, Boiral,
& Iraldo, 2016). As part of this third wave, standards for environmental
management systems (EMS), especially the European Union (EU) Eco‐
Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS) and the International
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 14001 standard, have become
increasingly relevant since the late 1990s in all EU member states
(Glachant, Schucht, Bültmann, & Wätzold, 2002; Montobbio & Solito,
2018; Papagiannakis, Voudouris, Lioukas, & Kassinis, 2019). Therefore,
the remainder of the paper focuses on these main voluntary environ-
mental management standards used today, taking into account their
differing origin as private decentralised (ISO) and public (EMAS) insti-
tutions (King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005).
As part of the trend described above, the ISO 14001 and EMAS
standards for EMS can be seen as means by which firms can continu-
ously improve their environmental performance while (at least) not
jeopardising their economic performance, based on arguments applying
the resource‐based view and theories of organisational learning
(Argote, 1999). This means that firms would be able to create win–win
situations in which private and societal interests are aligned, which
immediately raises the question of whether such a proposition is sup-
ported by empirical evidence. An alternative perspective holds that
ISO 14001 and EMAS are examples of rational myths (Boiral, 2007).
This would suggest more limited or even no positive (direct or indirect)
effects of EMS implementation and certification as well as the possibil-
ity of effect differences across standards (Testa et al., 2014).
This paper therefore analyses the influence of ISO 14001 and
EMAS certification, and temporal EMS implementation experience,
on the environmental performance of (compared with services) higher
polluting manufacturing firms in several EU countries and over time.
Because, by definition, voluntary initiatives always allow firms to safe-
guard their economic performance, our analysis can shed light on the
win–win proposition, which would imply increased social welfare.
EMS have become increasingly relevant over the last two decades
as a foundation stone of corporate sustainability management
(Fanasch, 2019), as evidenced by their high corporate adoption across
many industries (Eurostat, 2016; ISO, 2015; Papagiannakis et al.,2019). That popularity can at least partly be attributed to the ability
of EMS to reduce costs, increase sales, and induce innovation, partic-
ularly if the systems are externally audited and certified (Heras‐
Saizarbitoria, Arana, & Boiral, 2016).
Other research has echoed concerns with regard to the environ-
mental benefits of EMS (Hertin, Berkhout, Wagner, & Tyteca, 2008),
and the reasons for EMS adoption and the benefits flowing from that
adoption have been researched with regard to the differing views
(win–win vs. trade‐off) as concerns direct benefits (Delmas &
Montes‐Sancho, 2011). Nevertheless, there is far less research
directed at illuminating the indirect benefits and spillovers of EMS
(Boiral, Guillaumie, Heras‐Saizarbitoria, & Tayo Tene, 2018) and that
creates a research gap. Furthermore, environmental protection goes
well beyond addressing climate change (Rockström et al., 2009), which
imposes a requirement to consider indirect effects and spillovers of
EMS for the full set of environmental aspects and effects that matter
for manufacturing firms, which equally presents a research gap, even
when accounting for the recent literature (Wright & Nyberg, 2017).
Finally, most studies to date could not address these issues in a com-
parative manner involving different countries and standards from a
longitudinal perspective, which constitutes a third gap in the extant lit-
erature (Boiral et al., 2018).
This paper improves on this state by specifically analysing the indi-
rect effects of EMAS and ISO 14001 certification, as well as those
from the duration of implementation and resulting experience with
EMS in general, over time and across different countries. Focusing in
this way on indirect effects enables a more comprehensive assess-
ment and thus constitutes an important contribution to the body of
knowledge on voluntary standards as an instrument for (global) envi-
ronmental governance. In doing so, this analysis also provides answers
to questions raised by the research agenda developed by Heras‐
Saizarbitoria and Boiral (2013).
The remainder of the paper first reviews extant literature and,
based on that review, derives a set of hypotheses. Subsequently, the
data and analytical methods used to test those hypotheses are intro-
duced before the results of the empirical analysis are presented. The
paper provides a discussion and conclusions in its last section.2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES
Standardisation and the corresponding use of voluntary standards
such as EMS standards have been explored in many different contexts
in the past. For example, this concerns EMAS (e.g., Heras‐Saizarbitoria
et al., 2016; Montobbio & Solito, 2018; Testa, Boiral, & Iraldo, 2018;
Testa, Iraldo, & Daddi, 2018) and ISO (e.g., Heras‐Saizarbitoria,
Molina‐Azorin & Dick, 2011; Boiral et al., 2018) separately or in com-
bination (e.g., Neugebauer, 2012; Testa et al., 2014). These and other
studies also reveal that over time, ISO 14001 with its global scope has
become relatively more dominant than EMAS.
This extant work can be linked to the notion of standards markets
(Reinecke, Manning & van Hagen, 2012) suggesting that public
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introduce competing voluntary standards, which differ in their strin-
gency and flexibility. This is also true for EMS standards, where ISO
14001 was mainly developed by ISO itself and industry bodies,
whereas EMAS was largely promoted by the EU and the European
Commission as governmental actors, supported by non‐profit non‐
governmental organisations endorsing EMAS as a more stringent
EMS standard than ISO 14001 (Moon, 2002; Neugebauer, 2012).
Beyond adoption, the literature has also discussed several possible
economic and environmental benefits of EMS implementation and
certification (De Jong, Paulraj, & Blome, 2014; Heras‐ Saizarbitoria
et al., 2011; Boiral et al., 2018). Specifically, this concerns direct ben-
efits in terms of environmental performance improvements derived
from activities required by an EMS standard (Boiral, 2007; Montobbio
& Solito, 2018; Papagiannakis et al., 2019; Testa et al., 2014; Testa,
Iraldo, & Daddi, 2018; van Dijken et al., 1999; Wagner, 2009).
For example, De Jong et al. (2014) show that EMS implementation
and certification offer mostly financial, rather than ecological, benefits.
van Dijken et al. (1999) find the EMS implementation to be associated
with environmental innovations within the implementing firm. Simi-
larly, Montobbio and Solito (2018) and Papagiannakis et al. (2019) find
some evidence of EMS certification having positive effects on envi-
ronmental innovation.
On the basis of case studies in Canadian firms, Boiral (2007) shows
that ISO 14001 implementation can lead to ceremonial behaviour that
can be decoupled from daily practices. He therefore concludes that
adoption of ISO 14001 has a doubtful association with environmental
performance and direct factors related to it. Testa, Iraldo, and Daddi
(2018) and Heras‐Saizarbitoria, Molina‐Azorín, and Dick (2011) sug-
gest that the equivocal evidence may be partly reconciled by taking
a contingency approach.
Alongside the above, environmentally related indirect benefits can
be distinguished, such as heightened uptake of activities improving
environmental performance that are not required by any EMS stan-
dard. Similarly, indirect benefits that are not environmentally related,
such as improved staff satisfaction and recruitment, or general innova-
tion benefits might exist (Arimura, Darnall, & Katayama, 2011;
Grolleau, Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2012; Rennings, Ziegler, Ankele, &
Hoffmann, 2006).
Rennings et al. (2006) provide an early evaluation of EMAS effects
on innovation. Based on a survey and case data, the study identifies
information spillovers from the environmental statements under
EMAS for innovation in other firms. Furthermore, the study suggests
that learning through information spillovers from EMS implementation
is more limited for technical activities than for other organisational
activities. To illustrate, addressing ISO 14001, Arimura et al. (2011)
find that EMS implementation mainly supports employee co‐operation
and teamwork within the firm.
The above review of the literature again clarifies that research to
date has rarely addressed the indirect effects from a heightened
uptake of activities improving environmental performance that are
not required by any of the EMS standards. The hypotheses develop-
ment in the current research will therefore focus on them.Building on institutional, spillover, and learning theories permits the
identification of several hypotheses on various indirect effects of EMS
implementation (Argote, 1999). To start with, institutional theory sug-
gests that EMS implementation and certification could generate mis-
leading signals owing to asymmetric information enabling and
incentivising opportunistic behaviour of weaker or reactive firms pursu-
ing institutional isomorphism and organisational mimicry across firms or
within industries (King et al., 2005; Testa, Boiral, & Iraldo, 2018).
To credibly signal the opposite, firms that invested proactively in
EMS certification as a club good to differentiate themselves in the mar-
ket or to signal the existence of strong sustainability‐related capabilities
(Kollman & Prakash, 2002;Wernerfelt, 1984) have incentives to pursue
further technical and organisational environmental activities to main-
tain a credible signal and mitigate information asymmetries (Grolleau,
Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2007). This leads to the following three hypothe-
ses concerning EMS certification in general (e.g., EMAS or ISO 14001):H1a. EMS certification positively associates with the
extent of organisational environmental activities beyond
the scope of EMS.
H1b. EMS certification positively associates with the
extent of technical activities related to pollution
prevention.
H1c. EMS certification positively associates with the
extent of technical activities related to product
stewardship.In terms of spillover effects, ISO certification is more strongly ori-
ented towards cross‐referencing (Johnstone & Labonne, 2009),
because several other ISO standards relate directly to the EMS specifi-
cation standard ISO 14001. Key examples of those standards are ISO
14000 on environmental management principles, systems, and
supporting techniques, as well as several auditing‐related standards,
namely, ISO 14010 on principles, ISO 14011 on procedures, ISO
14012 on auditor qualification, and ISO 14013/15 on reviews and
assessments, but there are also others with more indirect links (ISO,
2015). Examples of the latter include ISO 14020/23 on environmental
labelling, ISO 14031 on environmental performance evaluation, ISO
14040/43 on life cycle analysis, ISO 50001 on energy management,
and ISO 14060 on environmental aspects in product standards as well
as ISO 26000 on social responsibility. Given that ISO 14001 frequently
only provides generic requirements (Testa, Iraldo, & Daddi, 2018), spill-
overs from the involvement of cross‐referenced ISO standards can be
expected. In contrast to this position, EMAS is a stand‐alone standard
and therefore cannot trigger organisational activities due to structural
or other similarities in the same way as ISO 14001 can.
Furthermore, the majority of requirements of EMAS and ISO
14001 refer to organisational aspects that are closely related to pro-
duction technologies and internal processes (Grolleau et al., 2007).
These organisational aspects are more strongly linked to technical
activities related to pollution prevention within the existing produc-
tion system (Könnölä & Unruh, 2007) but have only limited associa-
tions with technical activities related to product stewardship, which
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prompts the following two differential hypotheses:H2a. The positive association of ISO 14001 certification
with organisational environmental activities beyond the
scope of EMS is stronger than that of EMAS certification.
H2b. The positive association of EMS certification with
technical activities related to pollution prevention is
stronger than that with technical activities related to
product stewardship.According to Llerena (1999), EMS implementation experience can
lead to activities beyond the direct requirements of a standard owing
to organisational mechanisms oriented towards exploration (March,
1991), such as higher order learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Similarly,
EMS implementation benefits exploitation, where learning by doing
(Argote, 1999) and disciplined problem solving (Levitt & March,
1988) have been suggested as the most relevant mechanisms. There-
fore, temporal implementation aspects are expected to have effects
beyond those of EMS certification on the adoption of further
organisational environmental activities (Yin & Schmeidler, 2009). On
the one hand, this is because specific competencies and capabilities
needed for such activities are developed and refined in firms over time
through the exploration and exploitation mechanisms described above
(Heras‐Saizarbitoria et al., 2016). On the other hand, performance
feedback on implementation effects also accumulates over time, sug-
gesting that complementarities and new commercial opportunities
that can be realised based on EMS implementation unfold in a process,
which is distinct and therefore has an effect independent of any certi-
fication (Melnyk, Sroufe, & Calantone, 2003). Accordingly, we propose
the following hypotheses:H3a. EMS implementation experience positively associ-
ates with organisational environmental activities beyond
the scope of EMS.
H3b. EMS implementation experience positively associ-
ates with adoption of technical activities related to pollu-
tion prevention.
H3c. EMS implementation experience positively associ-
ates with adoption of technical activities related to prod-
uct stewardship.3 | DATA AND METHOD
The empirical data used for our analysis were collected in the context
of a larger research project during four waves of the German Sustain-
ability Barometer survey (2001 when it was integrated into the Euro-
pean Business Environment Barometer, 2006, 2011, and 2016). For
2001, integration in the European Business Environment Barometer
allowed us to utilise a large multinational dataset to compare evidence
across different countries and to establish a baseline. The three addi-
tional waves that cover further time periods in Germany permit theadoption of an intertemporal and longitudinal perspective. Heras‐
Saizarbitoria and Boiral (2013) call for both longitudinal and cross‐
country comparative studies; and combining both perspectives can
contribute particularly well to that research plea. For Germany and
the remaining European countries, 832 and 1,492 manufacturing firm
observations, respectively, could be included in the analysis. Based on
statistics from the German Federal Labour Office and the Organisation
for Economic Co‐operation and Development, a minor firm size bias in
the data should be acknowledged, in that for Norway, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and Germany, smaller firms are underrepresented.
However, this is a persistent issue in empirical management studies
in general, because smaller firms inherently have fewer resources
available to devote to participating in surveys (Armstrong & Overton,
1977). Beyond size however, response bias in the data is unlikely
because there is considerable variation across the responses in all
countries and survey waves, indicating that in terms of environmental
management, less active firms did respond to the survey.
The survey generally aimed to assess the state of environmental
management across space and time. The questionnaire asked firms
to self‐assess their adoption of organisational activities beyond the
scope of EMS standards and also to report their adoption of technical
activities with regard to pollution prevention and product stewardship.
Finally, a number of questions elicited corporate responses on impor-
tant explanatory variables such as EMS certification and implementa-
tion experience, industry membership, firm size, existence of a
quality management system, ownership, and market conditions. In
the survey, several procedural and statistical methods were used to
counter common method bias. Specifically concerning procedures,
respondents were guaranteed anonymity, the question order was
counterbalanced, scale items were improved following a pretest, and
different response formats were used. This action furthermore
reduced item ambiguity and social desirability issues. To test the
hypotheses formulated earlier, several variables were constructed
from the survey data based on prior literature and complemented with
a comprehensive set of control variables to account for important
firm‐, country‐, and sector‐level contingencies (Boiral et al., 2018).
For the first dependent variable, an index was calculated to gauge
if organisational action not required by the EMS was undertaken in the
3 years prior to the relevant survey period (i.e., 1998–2000, 2003–
2005, 2008–2010, and 2013–2015) using a set of binary coded items
(see Table 1 for details). Those items were aggregated to gauge the
number of organisational activities undertaken by the firm beyond
those required by its EMS. The index (hereafter referred to as NEMS)
ranges from 0 to 1 and corresponds to the ratio actually implemented
to possible activities. With regard to the other dependent variables,
pollution prevention and product stewardship, two separate indices
(abbreviated as PP and PS), were equally constructed based on rele-
vant survey items as detailed in Table 1 (as before, these referred to
the activity being undertaken in the last 3 years). These items were
also combined into aggregated indices, again ranging from 0 to 1, with
the interpretation as above.
EMS certification is measured by evaluating whether a firm is cer-
tified or verified according to ISO 14001 or EMAS, respectively. If
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sponding indicator is 1, otherwise it is 0. The EMS experience variable
is coded as the time passed since the first implementation of an EMS
standard. To avoid endogeneity with activities in the 3‐year periods
surveyed (i.e., the activity could be implemented before certification
was achieved), implementation time was calculated until 1997 (for
the period 1998–2000), 2002 (for the period 2003–2005), 2007 (for
the period 2008–2010), and 2012 (for the period 2013–2015). For
example, for the 2011 survey (referring to 2008–2010), if the EMS
was implemented first in 2007, that counted as 1 year of EMS experi-
ence. EMS certification was corrected the same way for all years and
countries (e.g., the EMAS/ISO dummies only assume unity in the
2001 survey if certification took place before 1998 to avoid
endogeneity issues, and the same is the case for 2006, 2011, and
2016 in Germany).
Several control variables are included in the analyses, such as firm
size, which is measured as the logarithm of the number of employees,
because the untransformed employee data are rightward skewed. This
control was included because the implementation of activities beyond
the scope the EMS depends on resource availability and large firms
has more scope to spread fixed costs such as those of the EMS
(George, 2005). In addition, because a quality management system in
accordance with ISO 9001 complements environmental standards
(Christmann, 2000), the presence of a quality management system
was included as a binary dummy variable (with “yes” coded as 1 and
“no” as 0). Furthermore, firm type was included in the analysis because
structures, processes, and strategies of parent firms can require the
implementation of activities beyond those required by environmental
management standards (Wagner, 2010). Accordingly, we created a
dummy variable and coded the firm as 1 if it was fully independent
and 0 if it was a subsidiary, or in some other way not completely inde-
pendent. In addition to these control variables, a binary dummy for a
firm's main industry was included, based on the following sectors: con-
sumer goods, chemical products, materials, machinery and equipment,
and electric and electronic devices. This accounts for institutional
effects related to industry membership. Finally, growth in the main
market was measured to account for possible effects of munificence
and slack resources (Dess & Beard, 1984). The measurement used a
5‐point scale anchored with considerably decreasing (coded as 5) and
considerably increasing (coded as 1).
To test the hypotheses, the data were analysed using ordinary
least squares regression with robust (and, as appropriate, firm‐
clustered) standard errors as well as Welch and F tests to compareTABLE 1 Items for dependent variables
Organisational actions beyond the scope of EMS (NEMS): taking environmenta
suppliers to undertake environmental actions; environmental/health/safety
benchmarking; eco‐labelling; informing consumers on environmental effects
“green” products; and implementation of life cycle analysis
Technical actions related to pollution prevention: reduced water use in product
measures to reduce emissions to air; measures to reduce emissions to surfac
technology
Technical actions related to product stewardship: “green” design of a new prod
materials; substitution of hazardous inputs; product recycling; packaging reccoefficients. In a variant estimation, we also used a more detailed
industry classification based on two‐digit North American Industry
Classification System categories, but the coefficients always had the
same sign and significance as with the broad industry classification,
except for a small deviation in Germany where H1c and H2b were
additionally confirmed for ISO 14001 in 2001 and in the case of
H3c in 2016. Accordingly, it was considered adequate to report only
conservative results based on the broad industry classification in order
to ensure parsimony. Tables A1 and A2 provide descriptive statistics
and correlations for the full sample.4 | RESULTS
In the following, results are presented from aggregated (and thus eco-
nomically more relevant) to disaggregated (and thus managerially more
important) levels. To start, Table 2 summarises results for the joint EU
data (except for those on Germany, for which four periods are avail-
able that are therefore analysed separately). The results clearly indi-
cate support for H1a, H1b, and partly for H1c in the joint EU
sample. H2a is not supported, as the coefficient difference is not sig-
nificant, whereas H2b, based on the Welch test (t = −20.9; p <
.0005), is only confirmed for ISO certification. Finally, H3a is sup-
ported in the joint EU sample, whereas H3b and H3c are not.
To better gauge variation and institutional effects (especially as
concerns any unsupported hypotheses in the pooled EU sample),
models were also estimated for each country separately. For these
estimations (see Tables 3–5), H1a is partly confirmed (for seven out
of 15 possible cases), whereas H1b is not supported (because no sig-
nificant association was found), and H1c is partially confirmed (in four
out of 15 possible cases). H2a is confirmed for Sweden and Switzer-
land, which suggests that in some countries, the spillover effects
across ISO norms may be better enabled by national regulation. Likely,
for similar reasons, significantly positive learning effects are found for
Belgium, Hungary, and Switzerland (for pollution prevention) as well as
for France and Switzerland (for product stewardship).
We could not involve the Welch test to evaluate H2b with regard
to Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium owing to overall
insignificant models for at least one dependent variable. For other
countries, it is not applicable because all individual coefficients are
not significant.1 Furthermore, the Welch test could only be calculated
meaningfully for countries where the association was consistent with
the hypothesised direction (i.e., where the association for PP wasl performance into account when selecting suppliers; placing demands on
data in the annual report; use of environmental performance indicators;
of products and production processes; market research on the potential of
ion; material recycling within the firm; use of waste streams of other firms;
e water; measures to reduce solid waste; and implementation of cleaner
uct; using less material per unit of product; substitution of nonrenewable
ycling; and using less packaging per unit of production
TABLE 2 Pooled estimations for Europe in 2001
Variable Coeff., NEMS Coeff., PS Coeff., PP
Firm fully independent −0.07 (0.01)*** −0.01 (0.02) −0.00 (0.02)
QMS 0.05 (0.02)** −0.03 (0.02) −0.02 (0.02)
Munificence 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 ( 0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Paper, wood, and printing 0.09 (0.03)*** 0.02 (0.03) 0.05 (0.02)†
Chemicals 0.05 (0.02)* −0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02)
Glass, ceramics, and metal processing −0.00 (0.02) −0.00 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Machinery and transport equipment −0.07 (0.03)** −0.02 (0.03) −0.03 (0.03)
Electric and electronic equipment −0.01 (0.03) −0.04 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03)
Other manufacturing 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
ISO 14001 certification 0.17 (0.03)*** 0.01 (0.03)** 0.06 (0.03)**
EMAS certification 0.10 (0.05)** 0.12 (0.05)* 0.01 (0.05)
Time since EMS implementation started 0.02 (0.01)** 0.002 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01)
Firm size 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.000003 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)*
Sweden (2) 0.14 (0.02)*** −0.10 (0.02)*** −0.05 (0.02)**
Switzerland (3) 0.04 (0.03) −0.00 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
Great Britain (4) 0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Hungary (5) 0.04 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)**
France (6) −0.01 (0.03) −0.03 (0.04) −0.05 (0.04)
Belgium (7) 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)†
Norway (8) 0.18 (0.03)*** 0.00 (0.03) −0.00 (0.03)
Constant −0.02 (0.04) 0.60 (0.05)*** 0.56 (0.04)***
Number of observations 1,474 1,485 1,492
R2 0.22 0.04 0.03
F 27.09*** 3.45*** 2.57***
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; industry relative to consumer goods and country relative to Netherlands (1) as base category.
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme; EMS, environmental management systems; ISO, International Organisation
for Standardisation; PP, pollution prevention; PS, product stewardship; QMS, quality management system.
†Significant at p < .10 level.
*Significant at p < .05 level.
**Significant at p < .01 level.
***Significant at p < .001 level.
6 WAGNERmore positive [or less negative] than for PS) and when at least one of
the two coefficients was significant. This scenario only arose for Hun-
gary, where H2b is supported in that certification to the ISO 14001
standard has a significantly less negative association with PP than with
PS (t = −12.50; p < .0005). Finally, H3a is confirmed for the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, Hungary, and Belgium (see Table 3). H3b
is confirmed for Sweden, Hungary, and Belgium (see Table 4), and
H3c for Sweden and Hungary (see Table 5).
As summarised in Table 6, the overall picture for the EU in general
is basically reproduced at the country level. Specifically and as a robust
implication for managers, the majority of significant associations relate
to organisational activities beyond the scope of the EMS (13 signifi-
cant associations, of which two are negative). For PS activities, seven
significant associations were found, of which one was negative. This is
consistent with the situation found for the detailed analysis by year inGermany that follows below. Finally, as reported for Germany below,
PP activities record the lowest number of significant associations in
the other EU states (i.e., four, of which one is negative).
Estimations with the pooled sample across all periods in Germany
are summarised inTable 7. H1a is confirmed for ISO 14001 and EMAS,
whereas H1b and H1c are not supported in the German data. Further-
more, H2a is not supported in the pooled estimations for Germany,
because regarding the organisational activities not required by an
EMS standard, the coefficient for ISO 14001 is significantly smaller
than for EMAS ( F = 5.20; p < .01). Concerning H2b, because none
of the relevant coefficients was significant in the regression estima-
tions, the Welch test could not be implemented meaningfully.
Although H2b could not be confirmed, the hypothesised effect would
appear plausible for EMAS certification because the estimated coeffi-
cient for PP here was larger than for PS. Finally, H3a is supported,
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TABLE 6 Summary of hypothesis testing for European Union (without Germany)
Country
EMAS,
NEMS
ISO,
NEMS
Time,
NEMS
EMAS–ISO
difference, NEMS
EMAS,
PP
ISO,
PP
Time,
PP
EMAS–ISO
difference, PP
EMAS,
PS
ISO,
PS
Time,
PS
EMAS–ISO
difference, PS
Norway + +*** −† n/s + + − n/s + + − n/s
Sweden +† +*** − ** (ISO > EMAS) + + + n/s + +*** − n/s
Switzerland + +*** − ** (ISO > EMAS) − + +* n/s +** + +† n/s
United Kingdom + + +* n/s − − + n/s + +† − n/s
Hungary +*** −** +*** ** (EMAS > ISO) − − +* n/s −† + +* ** (ISO > EMAS)
France +** + + n/s + − + n/s +† + − n/s
Belgium + − +*** n/s −** + +*** ** (ISO > EMAS) − − + n/s
Netherlands n/a +*** +* n/a n/a + − n/a n/a − + n/a
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme; ISO, International Organisation for Standardisation; n/a, not available (due
to multicollinearity); n/s, not significant; PP, pollution prevention; PS, product stewardship.
†Significant at p < .10 level.
*Significant at p < .05 level.
**Significant at p < .01 level.
***Significant at p < .001 level.
TABLE 7 Pooled estimations for Germany, 2001–2016
Variable
Coeff.,
NEMS Coeff., PP Coeff., PS
Firm fully independent −0.03 (0.02)† 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
QMS 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02)*
Munificence 0.01 (0.01)† 0.02 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)***
Paper, wood, and printing 0.03 (0.04) 0.05 (0.03) 0.06 (0.04)
Chemicals −0.03 (0.03) 0.07 (0.03)* 0.03 (0.03)
Glass, ceramics, and metal processing −0.07 (0.03)* 0.03 (0.03) −0.05 (0.03)
Machinery and transport equipment −0.06 (0.03)† 0.01 (0.03) 0.06 (0.04) †
Electric and electronic equipment −0.06 (0.03) −0.02 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03)*
Other manufacturing −0.04 (0.03) −0.004 (0.03) −0.07 (0.03)*
ISO 14001 certification 0.05 (0.03)* −0.001 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03)
EMAS certification 0.14 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Time since EMS implementation started 0.01 (0.002)** 0.003 (0.002)* 0.002 (0.002)
Firm size 0.03 (0.004)*** 0.04 (0.004)*** 0.03 (0.005)***
2006 0.06 (0.02)** 0.11 (0.03)*** 0.10 (0.02)***
2011 0.16 (0.03)*** −0.05 (0.02)* −0.12 (0.03)***
2016 0.08 (0.03)** 0.05 (0.02)* 0.08 (0.03)**
Constant 0.09 (0.04)* 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04)†
Number of observations 801 832 830
R2 0.36 0.24 0.26
F 29.48*** 16.00*** 23.19***
Note. Firm‐clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses; industry relative to consumer goods as base category.
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme; EMS, environmental management systems; ISO, International Organisation
for Standardisation; PP, pollution prevention; PS, product stewardship; QMS, quality management system.
†Significant at p < .10 level.
*Significant at p < .05 level.
**Significant at p < .01 level.
***Significant at p < .001 level.
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TABLE 8 Estimations for NEMS by year, Germany
Variable Coeff. (2001) Coeff. (2006) Coeff. (2011) Coeff. (2016)
Firm fully independent −0.07 (0.03)* −0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) −0.004 (0.03)
QMS 0.02 (0.03) 0.05 (0.06) −0.001 (0.06) −0.05 (0.04)
Munificence 0.03 (0.01)* −0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)
Paper, wood, and printing −0.03 (0.06) −0.03 (0.13) 0.03 (0.08) 0.09 (0.06)
Chemicals −0.01 (0.05) −0.04 (0.10) −0.18 (0.08)* 0.002 (0.06)
Glass, ceramics, and metal processing −0.07 (0.05) −0.09 (0.10) −0.10 (0.09) −0.07 (0.06)
Machinery and transport equipment −0.07 (0.05) 0.04 (0.09) −0.11 (0.07) −0.03 (0.07)
Electric and electronic equipment −0.11 (0.06)† 0.03 (0.08) −0.12 (0.09) −0.02 (0.06)
Other manufacturing −0.06 (0.05) −0.02 (0.08) 0.03 (0.07) −0.09 (0.06)
ISO 14001 certification 0.10 (0.05)* 0.15 (0.06)* 0.01 (0.06) 0.03 (0.04)
EMAS certification 0.11 (0.04)** 0.21 (0.08)** 0.07 (0.05) 0.13 (0.03)***
Time since EMS implementation started 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) 0.01 (0.003)**
Firm size 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)***
Constant 0.03 (0.06) −1.81 (0.12)*** 0.40 (0.11)** 0.17 (0.08)*
Number of observations 298 131 156 216
R2 0.23 0.41 0.13 0.36
F 9.77*** 10.86*** 1.96* 8.19***
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; industry relative to consumer goods as base category.
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme; EMS, environmental management systems; ISO, International Organisation
for Standardisation; QMS, quality management system.
†Significant at p < .10 level.
*Significant at p < .05 level.
**Significant at p < .01 level.
***Significant at p < .001 level.
WAGNER 11whereas H3b and H3c could not be confirmed in the pooled estima-
tions for Germany. The German results correspond largely to the find-
ings in the pooled EU sample in Table 2 and thus corroborate the
continued economic and managerial importance of the latter.
Tables 8–10 summarise the results for Germany when estimating
the models separately for the four time periods of 2001, 2006,
2011, and 2016. For organisational activities not forming part of an
EMS, they corroborate the results for EMAS from the initial estima-
tions with the pooled sample in all periods except 2011. Also, for
ISO 14001, the results for the pooled estimations are confirmed for
most of the time periods.
For individual years in Germany, H1a is confirmed in five of eight
possible cases, whereas H1b and H1c are not supported because no
significant association is found. Furthermore, H2a is not confirmed
because there are no significant differences or the coefficient for
EMAS is larger than for ISO 14001. There is also no support for H2b
where there is no significant association for any year, which means
that the Welch test cannot be meaningfully calculated. Finally, H3a
is confirmed for 2016 and H3b for 2001, whereas H3c is not sup-
ported because no significant association was found for any year.
Table 11 sums up the effects by year for Germany across all depen-
dent variables. The full set of estimations for all individual countries and
time periods reveal that industry‐ and firm‐specific factors are notuniquely driving the heterogeneous indirect EMS effects either,
because no other dominating factor could be identified, even though
such factors may well have a situational influence on indirect effects.5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
EMS can potentially complement government regulation of firms as
part of a new perception of global governance in the environmental
and sustainability contexts that particularly developed in new public
management thinking. This raises the question of whether empirical
evidence supports the contention that EMS implementation and certi-
fication contribute to sustainability.
This study contributes to answering this question by extending
prior work focused on EMAS (e.g., Montobbio & Solito, 2018; Testa,
Boiral, & Iraldo, 2018; Testa, Iraldo, & Daddi, 2018) and also including
ISO‐certified firms alongside firms without certification in a compara-
tive multicountry and partly longitudinal analysis of indirect effects
and spillovers, with all of former aspects having been identified as
important research gaps (Boiral et al., 2018).
Given the cross‐sectional effects in Europe as well as longitudinal
trends in Germany found in this study, as an important insight for
managers and policymakers, the initially positive evaluation of ISO
TABLE 9 Estimations for pollution prevention by year, Germany
Variable
Coeff.
(2001)
Coeff.
(2006)
Coeff.
(2011)
Coeff.
(2016)
Firm fully independent −0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) 0.07 (0.04)* −0.002 (0.03)
QMS 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.07) 0.02 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
Munificence 0.03 (0.01)* −0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)†
Paper, wood, and printing 0.01 (0.05) 0.09 (0.09) 0.02 (0.06) 0.13 (0.06)*
Chemicals 0.09 (0.05)† 0.09 (0.07) 0.00 (0.06) 0.08 (0.05)
Glass, ceramics, and metal processing 0.08 (0.05)† 0.13 (0.10) −0.06 (0.06) −0.02 (0.06)
Machinery and transport equipment −0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)
Electric and electronic equipment −0.06 (0.05) 0.03 (0.07) −0.02 (0.06) −0.02 (0.05)
Other manufacturing −0.02 (0.06) −0.01 (0.07) −0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05)
ISO 14001 certification 0.07 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) −0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
EMAS certification −0.07 (0.05) −0.09 (0.06) 0.06 (0.04) −0.003 (0.04)
Time since EMS implementation started 0.03 (0.01)** 0.01 (0.01) 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003)
Firm size 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)***
Constant −0.04 (0.07) 0.29 (0.11)** 0.05 (0.09) 0.15 (0.08)†
Number of observations 295 133 188 216
R2 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.24
F 9.11*** 3.51*** 3.10*** 5.81***
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; industry relative to consumer goods as base category.
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme; EMS, environmental management systems; ISO, International Organisation
for Standardisation; QMS, quality management system.
†Significant at p < .10 level.
*Significant at p < .05 level.
**Significant at p < .01 level.
***Significant at p < .001 level.
12 WAGNER14001 and EMAS certifications as voluntary instruments may have
been too optimistic.
Specifically, the findings for Germany reveal mainly EMAS effects,
which decrease over time. In contrast, across the other EU countries,
ISO effects are stronger, and only one significant negative effect was
found across all tests, indicating that EMS certification generally has
no clearly disadvantageous effect on environmental management
activities beyond those required by EMS standards. However, it also
has a positive effect in only about 50% of cases, which should caution
the overall economic significance of such standards, because it indi-
cates that several country‐, industry‐, and firm‐specific factors equally
matter for EMS to achieve an ultimately positive impact.
In addition, there are consistently far more limited EMS certifica-
tion effects on PP and on PS for both Germany and other European
countries, which may well be indicative for a limited reach of EMS
standards. Finally, in Germany, there are comparatively more limited
experience effects, namely, for PS in 2001 and NEMS in 2016, how-
ever, whereas somewhat more learning from experience can be iden-
tified across the other EU countries.
All these findings provide at least partial support for the suggestion
of Boiral (2012) that ISO 14001's effectiveness is overstated because
it frequently decouples formal structures from actual organisationalprocesses, and this also highlights the continued relevance of critical
and more diverse approaches to the study of EMS effects (Boiral
et al., 2018). As well, the effectiveness issues found in this study help
explaining the limited usage of EMAS for communication that has
been observed in related contexts (Heras‐Saizarbitoria, Boiral, Allur,
& García, 2019).
Furthermore, institutional arguments based on the varieties of cap-
italism and national business systems concepts would suggest differ-
ing complementarity with regard to EMS implementation and
certification (Whitley, 1999). Although the sample countries do not
easily lend themselves to being categorised as liberal or constitutional
market economies, a classification based on the national business sys-
tems approach is possible. More specifically, based on a detailed and
carefully validated country taxonomy by Hotho (2014), a distinction
can be drawn between four groups that together encompass all the
countries studied here. The first group is made up of Norway and
Sweden and can be described as a Nordic business system combining
centralised wage negotiations and high unionisation with low levels of
market regulation and state dominance. The second group is
characterised by a compartmentalised business system and includes
the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The third group corresponds
to a state‐organised business system and consists of the sample
TABLE 10 Estimations for product stewardship by year, Germany
Variable
Coeff.
(2001)
Coeff.
(2006)
Coeff.
(2011)
Coeff.
(2016)
Firm fully independent −0.02 (0.03) −0.01 (0.04) 0.12 (0.04)** 0.04 (0.03)
QMS 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 (0.07) 0.01 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05)
Munificence 0.04 (0.02)* 0.04 (0.02)† 0.03 (0.02)* 0.03 (0.02)†
Paper, wood, and printing 0.04 (0.06) −0.11 (0.15) 0.04 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07)†
Chemicals 0.06 (0.06) −0.04 (0.06) −0.03 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07)
Glass, ceramics, and metal processing −0.005 (0.05) −0.21 (0.07)** −0.05 (0.08) −0.08 (0.07)
Machinery and transport equipment 0.13 (0.06)* −0.04 (0.07) 0.08 (0.08) −0.02 (0.07)
Electric and electronic equipment 0.10 (0.06)† 0.11 (0.06)† 0.05 (0.08) −0.01 (0.07)
Other manufacturing −0.06 (0.06) −0.07 (0.07) −0.09 (0.06) −0.10 (0.06)†
ISO 14001 certification 0.08 (0.05) 0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
EMAS certification −0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.06) −0.001 (0.04) −0.04 (0.04)
Time since EMS implementation started 0.002 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.0005 (0.005) 0.01 (0.004)
Firm size 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)**
Constant −0.02 (0.07) 0.24 (0.11)* 0.02 (0.10) 0.19 (0.09)*
Number of observations 294 132 188 216
R2 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.22
F 8.28*** 4.34*** 3.81*** 5.23***
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; industry relative to consumer goods as base category.
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme; EMS, environmental management systems; ISO, International Organisation
for Standardisation; QMS, quality management system.
†Significant at p < .10 level.
*Significant at p < .05 level.
**Significant at p < .01 level.
***Significant at p < .001 level.
WAGNER 13countries France and Hungary. The fourth group corresponds to a col-
laborative business system and includes Belgium, Germany, and the
Netherlands.2 The distinct characteristics of national business systems
would suggest differences across the groups that imply greater effec-
tiveness of specific EMS standards for certain groups, which equates
to stronger and more consistent associations with the dependentTABLE 11 Summary of hypothesis testing for Germany
Explanatory
variable
NEMS
2001
NEMS
2006
NEMS
2011 NEMS 2016 PP, 20
EMAS +** +** + +***
ISO +* +* + +
Time + + − +** +
EMAS–ISO
difference
n/s n/s n/s † (EMAS > ISO) † (ISO
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing Scheme;
pollution prevention; PS, product stewardship.
†Significant at p < .10 level.
*Significant at p < .05 level.
**Significant at p < .01 level.
***Significant at p < .001 level.variables, and persistent and significant differences of the effects from
ISO 14001 versus the EMAS standard between the groups.
However, Tables 6 and 11 reveal that no such pattern can be iden-
tified. This suggests that institutional complementarity does not play a
major role in supporting the indirect benefits of voluntary EMS stan-
dards. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the rapid01
PP,
2006 PP, 2011
PP,
2016
PS,
2001
PS,
2006
PS,
2011
PS,
2016
− − + − − + + −
+ + − + + + + +
** + + + +** + + +
> EMAS) n/s † (EMAS > ISO) n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s
ISO, International Organisation for Standardisation; n/s, not significant; PP,
TABLE 12 Development of ISO‐to‐EMAS ratio by country over time
Country
ISO/EMAS
2000
ISO/EMAS
2005
ISO/EMAS
2010
ISO/EMAS
2015
Belgium 8.0 20.6 16.7 16.0
Germany 1.0 2.7 4.5 6.9
France 27.0 164.5 308.9 195.9
Hungary 33.0 993.0 86.8 97.0
Netherlands 60.0 44.3 213.4 820.3
Sweden 9.0 31.2 192.6 19.6
United Kingdom 29.5 99.3 231.4 379.2
Norway 0.2 16.1 41.6 180.6
Switzerland 24 n/a n/a n/a
Note. 2005 to 2016 data based on official figures by Eurostat (EMAS) and
ISO (ISO 14001); 2000 data estimated from the European Business Envi-
ronment Barometer 2001 survey and validated based on Kollman and
Prakash (2002); Eurostat data not available (n/a) for Switzerland whose
ISO certification increased from 1561 (2005) via 2575 (2010) to 3239
(2015).
Abbreviations: EMAS, European Union Eco‐Management and Auditing
Scheme; ISO, International Organisation for Standardisation.
14 WAGNERglobalisation of economic activity has quickly led to international con-
vergence in the field of EMS standards and that their voluntary gover-
nance approach was therefore less influenced by business system
differences.
Given that this interpretation is derived based on a comprehensive
model that beyond the hypothesised EMS variables also incorporates
important firm‐level causes (such as firm size or legal form) and sec-
toral determinants affecting indirect effects and spillovers, it further
highlights the relevance of incorporating firm‐ and industry‐specific
conditions in any analysis of how EMS standards impact.
Finally, with regard to the emergence of standards markets
(Reinecke, Manning, & von Hagen, 2012), the analysis sheds some
light on tensions between government, firms, and non‐governmental
organisations, such as standardisation bodies, especially in terms of
the rivalry between ISO 14001 and EMAS. In this respect, the (inter)
governmental initiative for EMAS by the European Commission (simul-
taneously introducing a competing voluntary standard to that of the
standardisation body ISO) was initially driven by the concerns of sev-
eral EU member states that ISO would not adequately take account of
public interests aimed at maximising social welfare but mainly those of
profit‐oriented private firms. The data in Table 12 suggest that EMAS
was ultimately less successful in the standards market than ISO
14001. Based on secondary data, the same table shows the ratio of
organisations certified according to ISO 14001 to those registered
under EMAS for the years 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015, the last year
for which activities were measured in each survey wave (e.g., a value
of nine means that for each firm certified to EMAS, nine firms had
ISO 14001 certification).3
It is evident that over time the ratio in all countries increasingly tilts
in favour of ISO 14001, indicating that the ISO standard is quantita-
tively more successfully diffused than EMAS, which is likely due inpart to the limited applicability of EMAS to the EU. Qualitatively how-
ever, in terms of indirect effects across all countries and time periods,
EMAS performs slightly better than ISO 14001 for NEMS, but not for
PS and PP (where, as detailed above, the effects of both standards are
very limited).
Given that sustainability for the purposes of our analysis can be
conceptualised as a bundle of public goods, whereas public manage-
ment can be defined as activities by public administrators contributing
to this bundle, for example, in the realm of environmental protection,
our findings also offer insights on the success determinants of new
public environmental management. Although evidence for actual per-
formance improvements is challenging to measure in a comparative
manner across countries and thus scarce (Tyteca et al., 2002), a neces-
sary precondition for such improvements is that the implementation
and certification of EMS as voluntary instruments trigger corporate
activities (such as the ones listed inTable 1) that improve performance.
The evidence found in this study for activities not required by EMS
standards (especially the globally predominant ISO 14001 and EMAS
schemes) suggests that this is often not the case and is also not easily
linkable to institutional differences between countries, nor to other
firm‐ or industry‐level factors (Knudsen, Moon, & Slager, 2015). This
can explain why over the last two decades our empirical data find less
progress towards sustainability than were predicted in the literature
on new public environmental management (Schaltegger, Kubat, Hilber,
& Vaterlaus, 1996) and voluntary instruments, such as EMS standards
(Koehler, 2007), which also cautions about the economic significance
of such approaches.
More generally, the findings may indicate that private and public
initiatives in the field of environmental management failed to ade-
quately promote the implementation of voluntary standards, given
the limited dynamic efficiency and spillover effects of those standards.
This suggests that voluntary standards such as ISO 14001 are too
weak to make sufficient contributions to (environmental) sustainabil-
ity. The results also reveal that the issue is aggravated by a lack of
spillovers from EMS particularly to more advanced practices, such as
PP and PS that relate more to technological innovation.
To rectify this situation, more stringent performance targets seem
necessary to foster sustainability, which also suggests a need to move
back to more mandatory regulation that should however include bet-
ter provision for flexible implementation choices than it did in the past.
However, as the comparison with EMAS shows, the actual design of
such voluntary instruments, for example, in terms of their spatial
scope and the management of their temporal evolution, is also crucial
for their effectiveness, an insight that future initiatives need to take
into account more than was done in the past.
In conclusion, this study contributes to an improved and more
nuanced understanding of global governance aspects in new public
environmental management, specifically as concerns voluntary (EMS)
standards. At the same time, the analysis has some limitations that
suggest some important areas for future research.
First, given that the indirect performance effect of voluntary EMS
standards is found to be relatively weak, it is important to ascertain
their direct benefits. Accordingly, more systematic evaluation research
WAGNER 15on those direct benefits is needed. Such research might, for example,
take the form of dedicated panel studies repeatedly surveying the
same firms over time to generate more comprehensive evidence on
direct effects. Similarly, a more widespread use of release invento-
ries—as has long been practised in the United States with its Toxic
Release Inventory—could help to reliably ascertain tangible and lasting
improvements in actual environmental performance (Gerde &
Logsdon, 2001). Such inventories would also facilitate linking actual
emissions and reduction to EMS implementation and certification, as
well as public sustainability targets.
Second, this study is consistent with theoretical arguments (Wijen,
2014) in identifying a trade‐off between the success of flexible stan-
dards in terms of diffusion and the success of more stringent (but
potentially less flexible) standards in terms of performance effects
(given that for the more flexible standard, ISO 14001, indirect perfor-
mance effects are more limited). In line with the suggestions by
Heras‐Saizarbitoria and Boiral (2013), future research should there-
fore investigate how such a trade‐off might be surmounted and, as
part of that effort, could move beyond the EMS context or
integrate it further with other approaches. For example, regional
embeddedness could be a contextual factor affecting the above
trade‐off, and future research might therefore expand on this study
by investigating its role in affecting the use and implementation of
voluntary instruments.
Third, although an integrated comparative analysis of EMS certifi-
cation and implementation effects across different countries such as
that reported here is only possible in Europe, it must be acknowledged
as a limitation that this represents only a minority of global ISO certi-
fications (Boiral et al., 2018), albeit the limitation was unavoidable in a
study seeking to present a direct comparison of EMAS and ISO. There-
fore, future research might focus more comprehensively on emerging
economies to compensate for this imbalance.6 | ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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ENDNOTES
1For the Netherlands, the EMAS variable was dropped in the estimations
for all three dependent variables due to high multicollinearity, which is
likely related to the unique Dutch approach at the time, based on the
country's National Environmental Policy Plan and covenants.
2Hotho (2014) based his classification on information for the year 2000;
thus, linking it to the data analysed here seems appropriate, with the only
exception being the Netherlands, which was classified only in 2011.However, because for almost all countries that were classified in 2000
and 2011 the classification did not change, it was deemed appropriate
to use the 2011 information for the Netherlands, because its basic param-
eters did not change between 2000 and 2011.
3Although an average ratio over the 3‐year window used in each wave to
measure activities might have been more precise, lack of EMAS data for
1998 to 2004 precluded calculating this measure. However, when calcu-
lating the averages for 2008–2010 and 2013–2015, only small deviations
compared with the reported values for individual years are found. Fur-
thermore, the ratio trend towards ISO 14001 remains based on
calculating ISO‐to‐EMAS ratios for the 2008–2010 and 2013–2015 ISO
and EMAS averages.
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mean
Standard
deviation
0.33 0.29
0.67 0.26
0.62 0.30
0.40 0.49
0.73 0.44
3.35 0.96
0.13 0.33
0.15 0.36
0.23 0.42
0.09 0.29
0.06 0.24
0.17 0.38
0.23 0.42
0.05 0.22
1.16 2.13
5.34 1.36
EMS, environmental management systems; ISO, International Organisation
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